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Most risk-sharing tests on developing country data are conducted at the level of the 
village; generally, the full risk-sharing hypothesis is rejected. This paper uses 
detailed data on all insurance networks within a village in Tanzania; networks are 
not clustered but largely overlapping. We test whether full risk-sharing occurs within 
these networks. We find that even within these smaller networks risk is not fully 
shared.  In the event of a health shock, households reduce overall consumption: they 
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Households living in developing countries are often faced with unpredictable income 
streams and expenditure needs.  A growing body of literature investigates the 
strategies that households apply to smooth consumption in the face of shocks (for 
surveys see Alderman and Paxson, 1992; Morduch, 1995, 1999; Deaton, 1997). A 
particular strand of this literature has focused on the overall efficacy of these 
strategies by concentrating on the smoothness of consumption over time or in the 
cross-section through testing the full-risk sharing hypothesis (Deaton, 1992; 
Townsend, 1994; Ligon, 1998; Ligon, Thomas and Worall, 2002; Gertler and Gruber, 
2002). In this paper, we build on this literature to test risk-sharing using panel data 
from rural Tanzania, but focus on risk-sharing within networks rather than at the 
village level.  We derive testable predictions for full risk-sharing across networks, 
when networks within the village are overlapping. To test this, we use detailed data 
from a full census of all insurance networks within the village by looking at the 
impact of illness shocks on outcomes.   
 
The level at which one should test risk-sharing has received relatively little attention.  
For developing countries, most researchers have taken the village as the unit of 
analysis.  There are two reasons for this.  First, it is argued that information and 
enforcement problems are likely to be small between the members of a village and 
this creates a favourable environment for co-operation.  Secondly, the sampling 
strategy and questionnaires used to collect household data typically allow the 
identification of clusters or villages for analysis, but it is often difficult to find any    
other sensible unit of analysis.  Still, it is acknowledged that there might be a better 
basis to test the full insurance hypothesis (e.g. Townsend, 1994 p. 541).   
 
There are some exceptions however.  For the United States, using the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) data, Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1992) were able to 
use information on child ￿split-offs￿.  These are children of parents that were in the 
initial sample, who, upon forming their own households, were included in the panel 
too (also their parents remain in the panel).  Linking the data of parents and children 
allows these authors to specify a test of whether ￿extended families￿ are altruistically 
linked, by testing whether consumption decisions are based on a common budget 
constraint, i.e. individual consumption within the family is independent of the 
distribution of income between the households.  Grimard (1997) studies risk-sharing 
among ethnic groups in C￿te d￿Ivoire.  Ligon (2001) finds suggestive evidence for the 
existence of two distinct risk-sharing networks (divided along wealth lines) in one of 
the International Crops Research Institute of the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) 
villages.  Dercon and Krishnan (2000) test risk-sharing within nuclear households in 
Ethiopia, and find that although generally risk-sharing could not be rejected, full 
insurance against illness shocks does not take place in poor households in the South of 
the country.  
 
The a priori grounds for using the village as a basis for full insurance -especially 
when risk-sharing institutions are important- are not always clear.  First, some 
households may form more or less formalised groups (burial societies, women￿s 
groups, labour sharing groups, etc).  Some (but certainly not all) of these groups may    
have an insurance element in them and generally (but not always) they comprise only 
a subsection of the households of the village. 
 
Secondly, consider an economy with heterogeneous agents.  There may be 
heterogeneity with respect to information flows, norms, trust, correlation of income 
streams etc.   In that case, when a household forms its network, it will not consider all 
other households to be equally suited as insurance partners (e.g. Rosenzweig and 
Stark, 1989).  For example, in many societies a single village is spread over a 
substantial area and information flows are, ceteris paribus, better between close 
neighbours than between villagers living, say, 1 kilometre apart.  Also, households 
involved in similar activities are likely to have better information concerning each 
other￿s income.  These and countless other factors make the smoothness of 
information flows, and thus the ease with which an insurance link can be forged and 
used, unequally distributed across all dyads
1 in the same village. 
 
Similarly, even within the same village households belong to different clans, castes, 
families, religions, etc.  These ￿institutions￿ may help impose norms and trust among 
their members.  Ceteris paribus, this creates an incentive to form links within one￿s 
group.  Finally, if villagers are heterogeneous with respect to their income generating 
activities, then the potential gains of co-operation may differ greatly across all dyads.  
Two households engaged in different activities may have weakly correlated income 
streams and may thus be better insurance partners (if we abstract from any 
informational concerns). Heterogeneity across dyads may cause a particular 
household to prefer to enter into an insurance arrangement with only a subsection of 
                                                           
1 In network analysis, a dyad is a pair of households.  When we say ￿across all dyads￿, we mean across 
all possible combinations of two households in the village.    
his fellow villagers and not with all of them.  This does, of course, not exclude the 
possibility of risk-sharing at village level. 
 
Even so, researchers have offered other compelling evidence (both empirical and 
theoretical) that insurance groups do not necessarily form at village level.  Murgai et. 
al. (2002) argue that there are increasing costs to group size.  As the network becomes 
larger the task of co-ordinating transfers, gathering information and enforcing 
contracts becomes more difficult.  In such an environment, full insurance at village 
level becomes an extreme case.  They back this argument up with an empirical study 
of water exchanges along irrigation canals in Pakistan.  Genicot and Ray (2002) show 
that one does not even have to impose increasing costs to have bounded group size.  
They consider a non-cooperative risk-sharing model, which is robust not only to 
single-person deviations, but also to subgroup deviations.  They show that introducing 
this (quite natural) assumption is sufficient to put bounds on the size of the network. 
 
In an empirical study of the rural Philippines, Fafchamps and Lund (2002) find that 
mutual insurance takes place through networks of relatives and friends and not at 
village level.  Their analysis gives insights in which coping strategies are used in 
response to which shocks.  It can also evaluate the efficiency of each coping strategy 
individually, but it does not yield a satisfactory answer to the question of whether all 
insurance mechanisms put together serve to smooth consumption.  Unlike them, we 
will not make any inferences about the efficiency of any specific coping strategy, but 
we will provide a test of whether all strategies put together smooth consumption.  In 
doing so, we will be serious about the fact that networks do not necessarily lie at 
village level.    
 
But even if the size of the insurance groups is inherently bound to be a number 
smaller than the number of households in the village, this still does not exclude full 
insurance at village level.  More specifically, it can be shown that if every household 
belongs to a network and all these networks overlap with each other (have some 
common members), then full insurance within the confines of the separate networks 
necessarily implies Pareto-efficiency at village-level. 
 
In Section 2, we set up a full insurance model, and from it we derive a regression 
equation.  Under the full insurance risk-sharing hypothesis household resources that 
are uncorrelated with shifts in preferences should not affect consumption growth once 
aggregate network resources are controlled for.  Next, in Section 3, we use a data set 
from rural Tanzania to give a broad overview of how people reacted with different 
coping strategies to the two major shocks of the past 10 years.   
 
In Section 4, we use the same survey to formally test the full insurance hypothesis.  
Controlling for aggregate network resources and aggregate village resources, we find 
that households are unable to smooth consumption when faced with severe health 
shocks.  We pay close attention to a number of econometric problems.  First, if illness 
in period t is predictable, households might already have catered for it in period t-1 
(e.g. through savings).  Our results would then overestimate the ability of households 
to smooth truly unpredictable shocks.  The second problem is that the interpretation of 
our results strongly depends on the separability assumption.  If utility is not separable 
between consumption and health, then even perfectly insured households will change 
their consumption pattern.  A third problem is that consumption shocks may be the    
cause of health shocks and not the other way round.  Finally, network formation is 
endogenous and this could potentially bias our results. 
 
2. MODEL AND ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
 
Pareto-efficiency in an isolated network 
Imagine an isolated network of N households who efficiently allocate risk.  They are 
isolated in the sense that they cannot enter into an insurance arrangement with anyone 
outside their network.  Pareto-efficient allocations can be modelled as if all N 
households pool income in every period and then decide who gets what share of the 
cake.   
 
Let, for example through some initial bargaining process or via a social planner, each 
household  i get a Pareto-share ωi of total network income, with ωi>0,  ∀  i and 
.  This Pareto-share will reflect the relative weight of the household in the  
allocation within the network.  Pareto-efficient allocation of risk then amounts to 
maximising a weighted sum of household utilities subject to a network resource 
constraint.  Let C
∑ =1 i ω
it be the consumption of household i at time t and λt the Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the aggregate network resource constraint at time t.  If we 
assume twice continuously differentiable utility functions with U￿>0 and U￿￿<0, then, 
following Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1992) and 
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or its differenced logarithmic equivalent 
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Equation (2) says that if optimal insurance is attained, then the growth of marginal 
utility of consumption in a given period should be equal for all households.  For any 
two households i and j in the network, we can substitute away λt in (1) and write the 
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which shows that the marginal utility of each household￿s consumption reflects its 
Pareto weight in the program.   Following Deaton (1997) and Gertler and Gruber 
(2002), assume that within-period preferences are of the constant relative risk 
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θit accounts for intertemporal needs of the household, which are not already captured 
by the household size, nit.  Plugging (4) into (3), taking logarithms and rearranging 
terms gives: 
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This equation holds across all the N-1 dyads that household i belongs to.  Adding up 
these N-1 equations yields (Bardhan and Udry, 1999) 
 






































































C or average (logarithm of) network consumption at time 
t.  Note that the final term in Equation (6) is a time-invariant fixed effect that can be 
purged out by taking first differences 
 


































1  (7) 
 
which implies that under the full insurance risk-sharing hypothesis household 
resources that are uncorrelated with shifts in preferences should not affect 
consumption growth once aggregate resources are controlled for.  Numerous studies 
have made use of Equation (7) to test the full insurance hypothesis at village level. 
 
Pareto-efficiency in overlapping networks 
Now assume there is a village which consists of two networks.  Say, network 1 has N1 
members and network 2 has N2 members.  Everyone in the village is member of 
exactly one network, except household i, which is member of both networks.  From 
Equation (7) we know that    
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which means that  
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If both networks operate Pareto-efficiently and they contain at least one common 
household, then the change in their average network consumption will be equal, up to 
taste-shifters.  This means that the growth in household consumption will be equal for 
all households within and across both networks (up to taste-shifters) and village-wide 
full insurance holds.  Even though both networks only pool risk within the confines of 
their own group, risk will be allocated as if it is pooled across all N1+N2 -1 households 
in the village.   
 
Regression specification 
Next, we specify an empirical test to determine whether or not households are fully 
insured against severe health shocks. Health shocks are particularly suitable for 
studying the implications of the full insurance model as they are often large,    
idiosyncratic and unpredictable.
2  Other shocks are likely to be more predictable.  As 
Morduch (1995) points out, if an income shock can be predicted beforehand, then 
households may have side-stepped the problem by engaging in costly ex ante 
smoothing strategies (e.g. diversifying crops, plots and activities).  Although health is 
less vulnerable to this critique than income, we will nevertheless take this possibility 
into account and purge health shocks of their expected components. 
  
There are two types of costs involved when a household is hit by a health shock.  
First, there are the medical expenses of consultation and treatment.  Secondly there is 
the income loss due to reduced labour supply of the sick person himself (if he was an 
income earner) and of any household members who accompany and/or nurse him at 
the hospital (e.g. wash him, cook for him, etc.). 
 
Say we have some measure of health, denoted by Hit, then ∆Hit can be interpreted as a 
health shock.  To test for full insurance at village level, Equation (7) can be 
transformed into the following regression specification: 
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where Vit controls for demographic changes in the household as these could represent 
shifts in preferences over time.  Fi are time-invariant variables like the age, sex and 
education of the household head, which can proxy for taste shifters that might be 
correlated with illness.  A full set of time dummies, Dt, controls for village level 
                                                           
2 Of course, there are also small health shock and even common health shocks (e.g. epidemics), but if 
the data are rich enough it is possible to separate these.    
variations, including variations of aggregate village resources (Ravallion and 
Chaudhuri, 1997).
3  Fixed effects controls for unobserved heterogeneity.  Gertler and 
Gruber (2002) estimate (11) without controlling for network effects and find that 
Indonesian households are unable to smooth 30% of the income loss from severe 
illnesses.  
 
If household i shares risk with only a subsection of the village, then we can construct 
a set of i￿s network members, say Ni, and write the cardinality of this set as #Ni.  We 
can reformulate Equation (11) so that it becomes a test for full insurance at network 
level: 
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The null hypothesis under full insurance is α=0, i.e. own health shocks do not affect 
own consumption once aggregate network resources are controlled for.  Furthermore, 
Pareto-efficient risk-sharing at village level (possibly through overlapping Pareto-
efficient networks) implies that β cannot be estimated because aggregate network 
consumption would then be perfectly collinear with aggregate village consumption.  
In a situation with partial risk-sharing the significance of β points to the relevance of 
networks.  If networks matter, we would expect β>0. 
 
                                                           
3 We study only one village. When several villages are included in the regression, village-time 
dummies are appropriate.    
The test for risk-sharing formulated above is defined in one composite consumption 
good.  Following Gertler and Gruber (2002), Morduch (2001) and others, we will test 
risk-sharing not just for total consumption, but also for food and non-food 
consumption separately.  The main argument is that different types of consumption 
may have a differential sensitivity to shocks and also, they may suffer from different 
types of measurement error, affecting the ability of our tests to identify any failure in 
risk-sharing or network effects.  It is worth noting that the nature of the test is 
unaffected, when using commodity groups, compared to using total consumption.  To 
see this, consider two commodities, food, C
f
it and non-food, C
nf
it.  Using the same set-
up as before, the only change is that we now have two first order conditions ￿ one for 
each commodity, but otherwise, (1) and (2) are unchanged.  Defining Uf as the 
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while a similar condition can be written for non-food consumption.  The standard 
result is maintained: the relative marginal utilities of two households will remain 
constant over time.  A specification defined in terms of the commodity group, but 
otherwise identical to (7) or (10) can also obtained from (13).  A sufficient condition 
is that the marginal utility for one commodity is independent of consumption of the 
other commodity - but additivity of the utility function across commodities is a strong 
assumption.  However, even if there is non-separability between the commodity 
groups, it follows directly from (13) that under perfect risk-sharing, individual 
resources should still not matter, but only network or community resources (Cochrane 
1991, p.965).  This implies that (11), defined in commodity groups, remains the basis 
for a valid test of risk-sharing and the role of networks.  Note, however, that since    
income effects may be different across goods, the impact on individual consumption 
of shocks to network and (if perfect risk-sharing does not hold) to individual 
resources may well be different across goods.  In particular, the income elasticity of 
the demand for food is likely to be lower than for non-food. 
 
econometric problems 
Some econometric problems have to be taken into account when estimating Equation 
(11).  The first is that if illness in period t is predictable, households might already 
have made some ex ante provisions for it in period t-1 (e.g. increased savings).  Our 
results would then overestimate the ability of households to smooth truly 
unpredictable shocks.  Following Dercon and Krishnan (2000) we tackle this problem 
by subtracting the predictable part of Hit from the measured Hit.  The predictable part 
of  Hit is measured through a fixed effects regression of Hit on household 
characteristics, consumption in period t-1 and time dummies.  
 
The second problem is that the interpretation of our results strongly depends on the 
assumption that the utility function is separable in consumption and health.  If this is 
not the case, then even perfectly insured households will change their consumption 
pattern.  The variables in Fit have been included to control for shifts in tastes that may 
be correlated with illness.  If they do not properly control for these shifts of taste, 
however, ∆Hit will be correlated with the error term, and its coefficient biased.  A 
third problem is that consumption shocks may be the cause of health shocks and not 
the other way round.  In the discussion of the regression results we will touch on these 
last two issue again and provide evidence that indicates that the results are not driven 
by non-separability, nor by health feed-backs.    
 
The fourth problem is that network formation is endogenous.  The direction of the 
bias of β is not a priori clear.  On the one hand, concerns about trust and smooth 
information flows might make households choose network partners with correlated 
income streams (e.g. close neighbours or households with the similar activities).  On 
the other hand, network partners might be selected because they are expected to have 
negatively correlated income streams.
4  Therefore, we instrument changes in average 
network consumption, using changes in demographic characteristics of network 
members and remittance flows to network members from outside the network as 
identifying instruments.  By using IV-estimation, we may also be able to address 
measurement error problems in the consumption of network members (on this, see 
also Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997).  
 
3. SHOCKS EXPERIENCED IN THE PAST 10 YEARS 
 
The data come from a household survey administered in Nyakatoke, a typical Haya 
village in the Bukoba Rural District of the Kagera region of Tanzania.  From February 
to December 2000 all the 120 households in the village were visited 5 times at regular 
intervals.  We did not take a sample of households, but interviewed all the households 
living in the village.  The total recall periods of most survey questions cover exactly 
one year (split into 5 rounds).  First, household interviews were administered to all 
household heads.  These served to collect data on assets, consumption, education, 
health, demographic movements etc.  A few days later individual interviews were 
                                                           
4 Grimard (1997) points to exactly this type of trade-off, which households in C￿te d￿Ivoire have to 
make when choosing their insurance partners.  Household living close by are easily monitored, but    
administered to all 220 adult individuals of the village.  Questions concerning gifts, 
loans, labour allocation, income, etc. were then put to the respondents. Gender-
sensitive issues were always implemented by enumerators of the same sex as 
respondents.   
 
Before turning to the full insurance test in the next section, we present self-reported 
data on how households have coped with the major shocks of the past 10 years.  Apart 
from giving a broad overview of shocks and coping strategies, we want to make three 
points, which motivate the econometric analysis in the next section.  First, sickness is 
most frequently identified as an important shock.  This helps substantiate our claim 
that in the econometric analysis we are dealing with a shock that matters.  Secondly, 
at least based on the descriptive statistics, households seem to be far from a full 
insurance situation, also when it comes to health shocks: consumption appears to be 
substantially affected by illness.  We will confirm this result in the formal tests.   
Thirdly, risk-sharing via transfers is the most important coping strategy to deal with 
the consequences of health shocks.  This indicates that a correct specification of the 
network is important for any inferences about the Pareto-efficiency of risk allocation.  
If households do not rely on risk sharing then the specification of the network does 
not matter. 
 
In the fifth and final round of the survey, we queried all adult individuals in the 
village for the two worst shocks their households had experienced in the past 10 
years.  It was stressed that we meant shocks that had a negative economic impact on 
                                                                                                                                                                      
have correlated risk, while households living far away are difficult to monitor, but have uncorrelated 
risk.    
the household.
5  The 207 respondents listed a total of 296 shocks ￿ younger 
respondents typically had less than two shocks to report. 
 
The shocks were not pre-coded, but written in the questionnaire as the respondents 
described them.  Later on we aggregated them into 7 groups.  Table 1 summarises the 
frequency with which these shocks were reported and how they affected the daily 
consumption of the household. As can be expected, households were least affected by 
ceremonies.  Lumpy expenditures score surprisingly high.
6  Households clearly cut 
back on consumption to invest in a house, a bicycle or education.  Unless one is 
willing to assume that all the reported shocks were common (which is extremely 
unlikely, with the clear exception of the 12 respondents who mentioned bad prices 
and adverse weather shocks), Table 1 suggests that households are far removed from a 
full insurance situation.
7  Only 12% of the shocks are reported to have no effect on 
daily consumption (and many of these are in the category ￿ceremonies￿).  About half 
of the shocks were reported to have affected daily consumption severely. 
 
Illness is the most frequently mentioned shock and, as Table 1 shows, 92% of these 
respondents say that this specific spell of illness had at least some effect on their daily 
consumption, with well over half saying that that they were forced to cut back 
consumption severely.  Remember that even some of the shocks categorised under 
￿deaths￿ are partly related to an episode of sickness that led to the death.  The 
                                                           
5 The framing of the question in Swahili was as follows: ￿katika miaka kumi iliyopita, kuna madhara 
gani ambayo yameathiri kaya yako kiuchumi￿. 
6 Strictly speaking these are not shocks, but choice variables. 
7 None of the seven categories of shocks is concentrated in a particular year.  There is, however, a 
tendency to report what happened recently.  This is probably due to the fact that respondents have a 
more vivid recollection of these shocks, and that we inquired about shocks that occurred since the 
formation of their household (which is less than 10 years ago for younger respondents).    
econometric analysis will confirm that the ability of households to smooth 
consumption in the face of severe health shocks is very limited. 
 
Next, we queried respondents on the coping strategies they used to face these shocks.  
Table 2 summarises the responses.  Risk-sharing was most frequently mentioned.  We 
see that gifts are the most popular form of risk-sharing  Loans and help through 
groups follow at some distance.  Loans are always very flexible, 0-interest 
arrangements between parties who know each other well.  Guarantors or collateral are 
hardly ever used.  Local groups usually help with transfers in kind, cash and of labour.  
The groups of Nyakatoke are described in detail in De Weerdt (2000).  Just under half 
of the respondents who reported to have used their social capital got help in the form 
of labour.  Typically, this is helping out at funerals or ceremonies, helping to carry a 
sick person to hospital, etc.  Table 2 shows that labour help is very frequently offered, 
but it does not score high in terms of perceived importance. 
 
Savings (in the form of cash) and the sale of assets are the next most important coping 
strategies.  Cash comes in very irregularly; the largest chunk is from the annual coffee 
harvest.  There are no banking services available, so everyone stores at least some 
cash at home.  By far the most popular asset to sell is stocks (maize, beans etc.).  
Livestock scores considerably lower, and durables and butura lower still.
8  Land is 
seldom sold.  Because of market imperfections, once a fertile, well situated plot is 
lost, it is difficult to buy back a similar plot after recovering from the shock and it 
would certainly have to happen at a much higher price than the household had (in an 
emergency) sold at before. 
                                                           
8 Butura is a Haya practise in which the farmer gives up the right to some premature crop ￿usually 
coffee￿ in return for cash; when the crop is ready for harvesting, the buyer of the butura can claim it.    
 
A response to a substantial number of shocks is taking on extra income earning 
activities.
9  Casual labour is the most popular and involves doing farm work for others 
for around TSh 200 ($0.25) for 4 hours of hard work.  Qualitative evidence suggests 
that casual labour is a poor man￿s coping strategy.  Its use may be limited by 
seasonalities in the labour market and by the very nature of the shock (e.g. death, 
illness or imprisonment of an important labour force in the household).  Other extra 
income generating activities ￿all of them very labour intensive￿ include trading fish 
and other goods, cutting grasses (used for mulching and as floor covering in the 
house), porting, additional brewing and distilling of rubisi (the local banana beer),  
selling snacks at local markets and increased efforts to sell agricultural produce. 
  
Table 3 links the data on coping strategies with those on shocks.  Risk-sharing is most 
important in the case of a funeral, a ceremony or a health shock.  It seems to fail, 
however, when it comes to shocks in income generating activities.  As expected, 




4. DATA AND REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
The self-reported data suggest that households are vulnerable to health shocks.  In this 
section, we present a formal test, investigating whether the consequences of these 
shocks are shared across households in networks and the village, based on the model    
discussed in Section 2.  Mutual insurance is cited as the most important strategy to 
cope with health shocks, while households identify specific network partners.  This 
implies that it is crucial to specify the consumption smoothing test at the correct 
network level.  We use the Nyakatoke Household Survey, described in the previous 
section, to study consumption changes following severe health shocks.   
 
Non-food consumption is measured in between rounds, while the recall period for 
food consumption is one week.  From the pilot interviews it became apparent that 
respondents had great difficulties in recalling the exact quantities of staple food they 
had consumed in the past week.  Because it was such a tedious and extremely disliked 
exercise, we decided to adopt a different approach.  Every meal has one staple and 
this is either rice, cooking bananas, or myaka, which is the Haya term for staples like 
cassava, yams, sweet potatoes, cocoyams etc.  This is a natural way for the villagers 
themselves to classify meals and thus it was not problematic to recall how many 
meals of each type they had eaten in the past week.  These three different kinds of 
staples had clear price differences, with rice being most expensive, followed by 
bananas and followed by myaka.  Carefully collected qualitative evidence suggests 
that there is no malnutrition in the village in terms of carbohydrates.  Therefore, we 
attached an age-sex weighted value to each type of staple, under the assumption that 
everyone had their fill.  All other food consumption was measured in exact quantities. 
 
This is fine if households switch staple in the face of shocks, e.g. eat more myaka and 
less cooking bananas.  However, a problem of this approach may be that, in the face 
of a health shock, households substitute their protein-rich food, like meat and fish, for 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 Kochar (1995), in an analysis of the ICRISAT data for households in central India, stresses the 
importance of increased labour supply as a response to shocks.     
staples.  In this case our data would show the decrease in protein rich foods, but not 
the increase in the consumption of staples.  Thus, if anything, the data would 
exaggerate the decrease in food consumption and underestimate the degree of 
consumption smoothing.  Note that this may bias coefficients on health shocks 
against finding risk-sharing ￿ we will return to this point later.  
 
Table 4 gives the mean and standard deviation of food, non-food (excluding medical 
expenditures) and total consumption across the five survey rounds.  Values are 
expressed in Tanzanian Shillings per adult equivalent per week.  There are about 800 
Tanzanian Shillings to a dollar and the equivalence scales we used are reported in 
Appendix 1.  Note that Nyakatoke is an extremely poor village.  Average 
consumption per household is only about $8.00 per week, which works out to be just 
over $2.00 per adult equivalent unit.  The average food-share in consumption is 82%.  
The data are not deflated, which means that they are difficult to compare across 
rounds, as prices tend to have a high degree of seasonality.  Price changes across 
rounds will be controlled for in the regression results by including time dummies. 
 
The data on health shocks come from a section in the household questionnaire where 
we requested respondents to make a list of any new or ongoing illnesses in the 
household.  Next, and for each household member that had been ill, we asked whether 
the illness had an adverse effect on the income earning capacity of the household (not 
at all, moderately or severely).  From these responses, we constructed a dummy 
variable which is 1 when the household reports to have incurred a severe loss in farm 
or off-farm income generating activities due to illness.  We define a health shock as 
the first difference of this dummy.  The first column of Table 5 shows that 11% of the    
cases in the pooled data set have incurred a health shock.
10  This amount is small 
enough to give us confidence that we are capturing health shocks that matter and not 
the minor ones.  The survey question on which the health dummy is based was meant 
to capture shocks through reduced labour supply.  Three quarters of these cases are 
adult members of the household, 25% are children below 18 years old and 5% are 
members older than 70 years old.
11  Even then, we cannot exclude that part of the 
shock does not result from the reduction in labour supply, but rather from the acute 
need for cash for medical expenditures.  Indeed, the average medical expenditures for 
severe health shocks are TSh 4373, about 14 times the weekly non-food consumption 
per adult equivalent. 
 
Before turning to the regression results, we present a simple, univariate analysis of the 
relation between consumption and illness.  The second row shows that households 
with health shocks have an average consumption downfall of 5.2%.  Looking at their 
relative movement within the village, makes their situation seem even worse. Those 
who do not experience any shocks (i.e. their index remains constant, or they go from 
sick to healthy) experience a rise in income of 5.1%.
12  The two last columns show 
that this drop in consumption is completely caused by a drop in non-food 
consumption, while growth in food consumption is not different.  We will come back 
to this issue when discussing the regression results. 
 
                                                           
10 This means, on average, 11% in each round.  Illness episodes are not concentrated in a particular 
round, so they can be seen as idiosyncratic shocks (not epidemics). 
11 Some of them might not be important for the supply of labour of the household.  Still, household 
labour supply can be reduced because a household member has to nurse the patient.  Indeed 80% of the 
children that fall into this category were admitted to hospital and thus required intensive nursing. 
12 Recall that consumption has not been deflated.  In the regression analysis below we will correct for 
price changes through time dummies.    
In the empirical test, we need to control for network consumption, without making 
any a priori assumption about who the network partners of each household are.  To do 
this, we make use of a survey question in which we asked respondents to list everyone 
they depend on for help and/or everyone who depends on them for help.  Respondents 
mentioned a total of 1126 network partners, of which two thirds live inside the 
village. Since 120 households were interviewed, this means that each household 
typically listed about 10 network partners on average. Because we took a full sample 
of the village, we can link all the network members who live inside the village to their 
respective questionnaires.  Figure 1 shows all the links between households in the 
village and shows that these networks are strongly overlapping.  This way we can 
calculate the average consumption of the network of each household (excluding the 
household itself) and include it as a regressor to control for network consumption (the 
second RHS term in Equation (12)).  Results are also presented for an alternative 
specification of the network, which takes flows of resources across nodes into 
account.  Here we define the network as all households who are at most 2 steps away 
from each other (geodesic distance equal to 1 or 2).  Thus, the network partners of 
ones network partners are also included.  
 
Network formation is endogenous and this could bias β.  Fixed effects purges the 
regression of any time-invariant factors which determine network formation.  Still, we 
can expect some spurious correlation between the change in network consumption 
and the change in own consumption if network partners are chosen according to, for 
example, profession and geographical distance.
13  We identify changes in network 
consumption by the change in mean demographic characteristics of the network    
partners and by the change in the mean value of remittances received from outside the 
network.  These are two variables that we expect to be strongly correlated with 
network consumption, but not with own consumption.  
 
Preference shifts are controlled for by including changes in household demographics 
(6 age-sex categories).  As further controls we include the age, sex and education of 
the head.  Means and standard deviations of these variables are reported in Appendix 
2.  Time dummies capture any village effects (including fluctuations of aggregate 
village resources and prices).  Remember that the fixed effects purges out any 
unobserved heterogeneity.   
 
Results are given in Table 6. We give IV-estimation results, treating network 
consumption as endogenous, and we report results based on measured health shocks, 
and those purged of the expected part of the health shock. Results for total 
consumption, as well as for food and non-food consumption are reported.  We report 
results using two definitions of aggregate network resources, the first defining 
networks by the direct network partners, the second by direct and indirect partners.  
We enter them both separately and together. 
 
All the results using total consumption seem to suggest that health shocks cause 
consumption to drop with roughly 6%, but the results are not strongly significant ￿ 
using measured shocks this result is only significant at about 12 percent.  In the next 
columns we split consumption into its food and non-food components. Food 
consumption seems not to be affected by health shocks. Non-food consumption is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
13 De Weerdt (2002) and De Weerdt and Van de gaer (2002) analyze the factors that underlie network 
formation in the village.    
quite strongly affected ￿ by about 21-30%, and these effects are significant at 5% or 
less.
14  In all regressions, the coefficients on unexpected and total health shocks are 
almost exactly the same, suggesting that this correction is relatively unimportant.   
Overall, this suggests that full risk-sharing is rejected ￿ for total consumption only at 
12 percent using the overall health shock, but with much stronger evidence when 
focusing on non-food consumption.  
 
What might explain this difference in findings between food and non-food 
consumption? Given that full risk-sharing is rejected, this does not need to be very 
surprising.  First, the income elasticity for food is bound to be lower than for non-food 
￿ so that if an income shock, caused by a health shock hits the household, non-food 
consumption is likely to be most responsive. The point estimates of the coefficients 
are consistent with this interpretation.  Local conditions make the larger 
responsiveness of non-food consumption also very plausible.  First, in Haya villages 
self-insurance for food consumption is relatively easy (at least compared to certain 
other rural societies).  Food is easily stored (a banana field can go on bearing fruit for 
some time without much tending to and there is always plenty of cassava in the 
ground at any time of the year).  Other crops, which have a clear harvesting period 
(beans, maize, etc...), are stored as food in the house. However, the main staples, such 
as bananas or cassava are not easily or commonly traded, being bulky relative to 
value, so stocks will often not be monetised when shocks occur. Food consumption 
will then be relatively easily kept smooth, but non-food consumption would take the 
larger part of the adjustment. Furthermore, even if partial risk-sharing occurs
15, it is 
probably relatively easier to get food assistance from neighbours and friends, than 
                                                           
14 Gertler and Gruber (2002) also run separate regressions for food and non-food consumption.  In their 
data they find that both types of consumption are equally affected by health shocks.     
getting cash assistance from them.  Donors may wish to tie their transfer to exclude 
false claims by the recipient or because they have paternalistically altruistic 
preferences (Pollack, 1988).  Alternatively, donors may prefer to make food transfers, 
because they have less bite in the budget constraint than cash related non-food 
transfers.   
 
The results of Table 6 show that consumption feed-backs into health are not driving 
our results.  If consumption shocks were causing illness shocks, we would expect to 
see this effect working through food consumption, which is not the case.  The fact that 
food consumption does not vary with health shocks also goes some way to refuting 
the non-separability hypothesis, as it is commonly assumed that non-separability of 
consumption and health works through reduced consumption of food by the sick 
person.  Even if health shocks were to shift preferences for non-food items, it is 
unlikely that the preferences of one individual in the household could have such a 
huge effect on the non-food consumption of the whole household, given that the 
average household size is 4.7.
16 
 
As a further test of the possibility that non-separability is driving our results, we use 
an alternative endogenous variable.  At the end of the survey we asked the 
respondents to reflect on the different periods of the year which corresponded to the 
survey rounds.  We asked them when their economic situation was good and when it 
was bad rated from 1 (very good ) to 5 (very bad).  The responses provide us with an 
aggregate economic index, indicating how the respondent sees his general economic 
position in that round.  The key point is that this index captures how hard the budget 
                                                                                                                                                                      
15 Recall that the rejection of perfect risk-sharing may imply either partial or no risk-sharing. 
16 A similar argument is given by Gertler and Gruber (2002).    
constraint bites and should be free from any preference shifts.
17  Thus it can serve as 
an alternative measure of consumption, with the added advantage that non-
separability cannot distort the results.  We re-estimated Equation (12), but replaced 
consumption by the self-reported economic index.  The results of this exercise (not 
reported) show that shocks have a statistically significant effect (at 1%) in terms of 
reducing the overall economic position, raising the index with roughly 30%. 
 
Finally, what can we conclude about the functioning of networks?  First note that we 
treat these as endogenous and use remittances to the networks, network-level 
demographic and livestock values as instruments. The Hansen J-statistic is used to test 
the validity of these instruments.
18 In all cases, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
at 5% or less, so no problems with the instruments are detected.  We entered changes 
in the logarithm of network consumption of the direct network partners, as well as the 
relevant changes for direct and indirect network partners. When entering them 
together, we investigate whether controlling for proximate networks, a broader 
definition of networks adds anything.  
 
While our results confirm that the village does not provide full insurance to 
households, they also suggest that even small tightly-knit networks do not fully insure 
consumption.  This result can be derived even without looking at the coefficient of 
network consumption: full risk-sharing has been rejected, and this is particularly 
reflected in fluctuations in non-food consumption.  
                                                           
17 One could argue that when a household member is ill the household is bound to say that the situation 
is bad.  When collecting the data for this question, we took time to explain first that we were talking of 
only the economic situation of the household.  The core Swahili word we used to make this distinction 
was ￿hali ya uchumi￿ (lit. the state of the ￿economy￿ of your household).  Furthermore, only about two 
thirds of the households who have a health shock have a decline in their aggregate shock index.    
 
The hypothesis that food consumption can be kept smooth in the face of idiosyncratic 
shocks cannot be rejected, but the test cannot distinguish whether networks and within 
network transfers are responsible for this ￿ in any case, the test statistics do not rule 
this out.  We know that all regression specifications control for aggregate village 
resources through time dummies and we know that all networks in the village overlap 
with each other.
19  In Section 2 we showed that when all networks overlap, full 
insurance at the network level would imply full insurance at the village level. In fact, 
village and network consumption changes should be indistinguishable, with 
measurement error providing the only reason why perfect collinearity may not occur. 
The insignificant network coefficients are consistent with this interpretation. Whether 
food transfers are behind this result cannot be established from these data. Food 
consumption smoothing via storage may also account for this result, with the 
insignificance of the network coefficients simply following from the irrelevance of 
networks for consumption smoothing. The qualitative evidence discussed in section 3 
(table 3) provides some evidence that both may play a role. 
 
The coefficients of network consumption in the case of non-food consumption 
provide clearer evidence regarding the role of networks. Recall that idiosyncratic 
shocks appear to result in consumption fluctuations, implying the rejection of full risk 
sharing. We find evidence that networks play a role in sustaining non-food 
consumption via partial risk-sharing. In this case, and given controls for village level 
resources, a positive and significant coefficient on network consumption provides 
                                                                                                                                                                      
18 This is a test of the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation. The J-statistic is 
consistent if errors are heteroskedastic.    
evidence for this, since there is little reason for this to happen if all mutual support 
occurs at the village level or if consumption smoothing occurs via the depletion of 
stocks and assets. This evidence is clearest in column (16) to (18). Using unexpected 
shocks only, changes in the consumption of direct partners is significant at 5%.  In 
column (18), the network variables are positive and jointly significant at 7%; but since 
changes in consumption using the larger network definition are not significant in (17), 
this suggests that the more narrow definition of the network is more appropriate. This 
suggests that some form of partial risk-sharing appears to occur in these villages, and 
that only direct network partners form the relevant group. This may indicate 
substantial costs to flow across nodes in the network. It also means that treating 
overlapping networks as a single network may be misleading.  
 
As a final test of the robustness of our results, we tried to further address 
measurement error in network consumption, using the aggregate economic index 
mentioned before. Since this aggregate economic index can be viewed as an 
independent way of measuring current conditions, with measurement error that is 
likely to be uncorrelated with measurement error in consumption, we used the average 
network index as an additional instrument in our regression. The results, both in terms 
of coefficients and standard errors, were virtually unaffected, suggesting that 




                                                                                                                                                                      
19 De Weerdt (2002) shows that all households in the village are connected to each other if one allows 
for five steps across the network (i.e. the maximal geodesic distance in the network equals five).    
When respondents in Nyakatoke were asked to mention the two worst shocks over the 
past 10 years, health shocks were most frequently mentioned.  In well over half of 
these cases, the illness was reported to have severely cut back the daily consumption 
of the household and only 8% reported to have suffered no loss in consumption. 
Formal statistical analysis confirms these self-reported data.  Using panel data we 
have found that households fail to cope with severe health shocks.  They have to cut 
back non-food consumption drastically to cope with the loss of income and to pay 
their medical bills.  This result is all the more striking, because we have tested full 
insurance in small networks of self-selected households.  Cash-related full insurance 
is not achieved, not even in very small networks. At the same time, we find that 
networks matter for consumption smoothing, and the village is not the appropriate 
unit for partial or full risk-sharing analysis. 
 
One reason for this failure may be that, even at this level, problems of information 
and enforcement distort optimal outcomes.  Another reason may be that Pareto-
efficiency is not achieved because all networks are intertwined with each other.  If 
households have obligations in several networks at the same time, then full insurance 
would imply insuring your network partner for any claims made upon him by his 
other partners (with whom you might not have a direct link).  It is quite conceivable 
that households have built in contingencies to limit such reinsurance claims and that 
this prevents full insurance to be attained, even within the confines of small networks.  
Surprisingly, very little work has been done on frictions in flows of resources between 
different insurance networks.  A priori, one would expect frictions to be relatively 
high in insurance networks (e.g. compared to information networks). 
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 Table 2: Coping strategies used in the past 10 years (in response to the 2 worst 
shocks that have affected household in the past 10 years). 
 
NUMBER OF TIMES REPORTED 
 
 
counting only those 
who rated this 





 N  %
1  N %
1 
RISK-SHARING  126  43  224  76 
private gifts  86  29  177  60 
private loans  40  14  76  26 
private labour transfers  18  6  106  36 
community organisations  40  14  84  28 
SAVINGS (drawing on cash reserves)  122  41  197  67 
SALE OF ASSETS  110  37  166  56 
stocks  54  18  95  32 
livestock 37  13  53  18 
butura
2  19  6  29  10 
durables  15  5  29  10 
land  3  1  5  2 
EARNING EXTRA INCOME  52  18  95  32 
casual labour  27  9  47  16 
other incomes  27  9  54  18 
OTHERS  3  1  7  2 
taking children from school  0  0  6  2 
moneylenders  2  1  2  1 
help from the government or NGOs  1  0  2  1 
Source: Nyakatoke Household Survey 
Notes:    1.  The denominator is the total number of shocks that were mentioned (296).  
2.  Butura is a Haya practise in which the farmer gives up the right to some premature crop ￿
usually coffee￿ in return for cash; when the crop is ready for harvesting, the buyer of the 
butura can claim it. 
  
    
 
Table 3: Responses to the two major shocks of the past 10 years (percentage of 
shocks for which the response was considering  to be ￿very important￿). 
% of cases which reported to have used the following 
coping strategy in response to the shock specified 















death  57 33 39 10  4 
ceremonies  52 74 17 17  0 
sickness  50 37 44 13  0 
lumpy  expenditures  32 61 45 13  0 
crime & court cases  33  28  40  15  0 
shock in income gen. act.   12  32  32  44  0 
others  32 24 36 32  0 
 
TOTAL  43 41 37 18  0 
Source: Nyakatoke Household Survey 
Note:  The denominator is the number of times the shock was mentioned 
 
    
Table 4: Mean and standard deviation of non-deflated food, non-food (excluding 
medical expenditures) and total consumption across the 5 survey 







      
ROUND 1  1646  1182  460 
 (1159)  (577)  (828) 
ROUND 2  1446  1206  239 
 (734)  (563)  (258) 
ROUND 3  1557  1309  259 
 (805)  (671)  (263) 
ROUND 4  1791  1440  351 
 (1141)  (719)  (792) 
ROUND 5  1722  1457  265 
 (759)  (660)  (264) 
TOTAL 1632  1317  316 
 (945)  (648)  (558) 
N  566 570 566 
Source: Nyakatoke Household Survey 
NOTE:  in each cell the top number is the mean and the bottom one (between brackets) the standard 
deviation. 
    
 
Table 5: Impact of health shocks on consumption: average consumption change 














no 89  0.051 0.068 -0.010 
yes 11  -0.052 0.052 -0.426 
TOTAL 100  0.040  0.066  -0.054 
Source: Nyakatoke Household Survey 
Note: N=402; because we look at first differences, we ￿lose￿ one round of observations. 
 
 Table 6: Testing risk-sharing and network effects. LHS=changes in log 
consumption per adult (i.e. fixed effects within estimator). IV 
regressions with robust standard errors. Z-scores in brackets. 
Total Consumption 








(1.47)     
Unexpected part of the health 






Change in consumption of direct 
network partners 
-0.27 
(0.84)    -0.10 
(0.35) 
-0.01 
(0.04)    0.12 
(0.46) 
Change in consumption of direct 
and indirect network partners    0.58 
(0.63) 
1.25 




p-value for joint significance F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
p-value for Hansen J-Statistic  0.06  0.58  0.29  0.17  0.69  0.49 
Food Consumption 
 (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 





(0.44)     
Unexpected part of the health 






Change in consumption of direct 
network partners 
-0.01 
(1.15)    -0.23 
(1.04) 
-0.31 
(1.09)    -0.29 
(1.13) 
Change in consumption of direct 
and indirect network partners    0.25 
(0.22) 
1.27 




p-value for joint significance F  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00 
p-value for Hansen J-Statistic  0.19  0.91  0.69  0.38  0.92  0.78 
Non-Food Consumption 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 





(2.29)     
Unexpected part of the health 






Change in consumption of direct 
network partners 
-0.06 
(0.12)    -0.17 
(0.46) 
0.87 
(1.99)    0.54 
(1.54) 
Change in consumption of direct 
and indirect network partners    0.82 
(0.64) 
2.23 




p-value for joint significance F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.05  0.04 
p-value for Hansen J-Statistic  0.15  0.59  0.45  0.64  0.52  0.40 
Source: Nyakatoke Household Survey 
Note: absolute values of the z-scores are given in brackets under the coefficient.  All regressions 
include the change in 6 demographic categories (males and females aged 0 to 5, 6 to 15 and 16+) 
and controls for the age, sex and education of the household head.  The latter is a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not the head has completed primary.  All regressions include time dummies.  
The consumption concept (food, non-food or total) for the network partners is always the same as 
that for own consumption and expressed in natural logarithms.  In the IV regressions, changes in 
the log of average network consumption are identified by changes in the mean value of 
remittances network partners receive from their none-network partners, changes in the mean 
values of livestock owned by households in the network and by the changes in their mean 
demographic characteristics.  The regressions for health shocks are based on 402 observations.  
The regressions for unexpected health shocks are based on 294 observations (we lose one round 
because lagged consumption is explains predicted health). Tests statistics reported include the p-
value for the Hansen J-statistic.    40
APPENDIX 1: The network graph of Nyakatoke.  Each dot is a household, each 
line a link.  The map has been drawn using a program called DOTTY from Graphiz.   41
 






0 .33  .33 
1 .46  .46 
2 .54  .54 
3-4 .62 .62 
5-6 .74 .70 
7-9 .84 .72 
10-11 .88  .78 
12-13 .96  .84 
14-15 1.06  .86 
16-17 1.14  .86 
18-29 1.04  .80 
30-59 1.00  .82 
60+ .84 .74 
Note: Based on World Health organisation equivalence scales quoted in Dercon 
(1998) and McCulloch (1999). 
   42
Table Appendix 2: descriptive statistics of regressors (across the pooled sample). 
VARIABLE  N  MEAN S.D. 
male members between younger than 5  585  0.5  0.7 
male members between 5 and 15  585  0.6  0.8 
male adults   585  1.1  0.9 
female members younger than 5  585  0.5  0.7 
female members between 5 and 15  585  0.7  0.9 
female adults  585  1.3  0.7 
age of the household head  119  45  16 
head has completed primary education 
  (no=0, yes=1) 
119 0.60 0.5 
sex of the household head 
  (female=0, male=1) 
119 0.79 0.4 
Source: Nyakatoke Household Survey 